INTRODUCTION
THE Danish success in achieving industrial peace is so universally acclaimed that a study of it requires no apologies. But apart from the intrinsic appeal of a successfully functioning system, a student of legal institutions and arrangements cannot fail to gain a deeper understanding of his immediate legal environment by examining it from a new vantage-point. It is the latter consideration, as much as the former, which motivates this study. If, as Holmes says, the life of the law is not logic but experience, we should not hesitate to profit vicariously from the experience of others.
I am anxious to point out that I do not read or speak Danish. The presence of this language barrier to primary materials forced reliance upon two other major sources of information: First, translations of basic public documents, English-language pamphlets on Danish labour relations and labour law, and the classic study of Professor Galenson.1 In so far as insights culled from these sources may appear in this study, my debt to them is gratefully acknowledged. I do not, however, feel entitled to claim the scholarly exactitude which can only come from first-hand research. Secondly, interviews with persons engaged in labour affairs in Denmark. Interviews often reveal attitudes and subtleties not readily discernible in printed matter; on the other hand the persons interviewed unanimously asked, as the price of frankness, assurances that views expressed would be reported without attribution of source. Accordingly, I ask the reader's indulgence for my failure to identify the source of many statements. provides that this agreement continues to bind affiliates of the two central organisations notwithstanding their withdrawal from membership. It is important to note that for over sixty years this Agreement has been virtually the only substantive " law " in the field of labour relations; that this " law " has been self-imposed, by agreement not legislation; and that the enforcement of the rules has been entrusted to the Labour Court, an essentially private tribunal (albeit one with statutory warrant).
With the Basic Agreement as a framework, the functioning of the system can best be understood by a brief description of the two central organisations, the process of collective bargaining, and the network of tribunals erected by the parties to administer the system. primary function, however, is the conduct of industrial relations, two of its constitutional objects being " to contribute towards the avoidance as far as possible of disputes between employers and workers or to seek their solution by peaceful means without work stoppages," and " to contribute towards the maintenance of a spirit of solidarity and a common approach on the part of employers' organisations so as to protect employers' common interests in all questions concerning wages and working conditions " (section 2). The effective achievement of these objectives requires a delegation by individual employers to their association of substantial authority in matters relating to industrial relations. That this has been accomplished has been attributed 6 to a variety of factors: a tradition of organisation under the Guilds (some of which were actually transformed into employers' associations); the small unit size of many employers requiring organisation for self-protection; the absence of any extreme competitive spirit because of a limited domestic market; and a small and stable community structure.
The D.A. is primarily a federation of trade associations, with provision being made for membership by individual firms ineligible to join any trade association. Its government is hierarchical, with a large general assembly (600 members), a central committee of fifty-four, and an executive committee of fifteen. As might be expected, the latter is the effective policy-maker. Day-to-day affairs are conducted by a substantial secretariat whose knowledge and professional skills in all matters relating to the D.A.'s programme are impressive. The attitude of the professional labour relations personnel towards labour leaders with whom they are in constant contact is, in my opinion, a major factor in the Danish success. Certainly it is radically different from the typical North American attitude and is in advance, as well, of the attitude of many individual Danish employers. As Galenson notes: " The chief work of the secretariat is the amicable adjustment of labour disputes; it is the executive committee and the higher representative bodies that are called upon to conduct industrial warfare." 7 This devotion to " amicable adjustment " seems to stem not merely from a respect and understanding based upon constant personal involvement. It is rather a considered professional judgment, unclouded by that personal financial or psychological commitment to the outcome of the particular dispute, which an employer inevitably has.
The constitution of the D.A. forbids affiliates (without the consent of the executive committee) to bargain over wages and 6 See Galenson, op. cit., c. 5.
B. The Danish Federation of Trade Unions
The Danish Federation of Trade Unions (the " L.O.") represents approximately 97 per cent. of all organised workers, 60 per cent. of the total work force (including agriculture) and 90 per cent. of those persons employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, and communications.
As the basis of an understanding of its internal organisation, it must be noted that one union (the Labourers' Union) comprises approximately 50 per cent. of the total membership, while the smallest affiliates (comprising 40 per cent. of the total number of affiliates) account for only 4 per cent. of the total membership.
Without detailing the development of the present structure,9 strong centrifugal forces are obviously to be expected.
Complicating The problem of employer recognition of unions and the refusal to bargain collectively which so vexed North American labour relations prior to the passage of compulsory collective bargaining legislation-with its residue of mistrust and antagonism-has not been a significant problem in Denmark since 1899. The September Agreement of that year is an implicit acknowledgment by each party of the other's right to pursue its legitimate objectives and (in its present draft) expressly recognises the desirability of collective agreements and the rights of self-organisation.
In the few recognition disputes which have occurred in recent decades (with unaffiliated employers) the use of economic pressure has been held lawful. Thus Danish labour, like British labour, has exhibited little interest in constructing an elaborate legal mechanism, on the North American model,'" to deal with the problem of recognition. Rather, it has been thought that a union too weak to compel recognition lacks the requisite bargaining power effectively to negotiate a collective agreement.
The allied problem of employer interference with union membership was similarly solved by the September Agreement. If there is an actual or threatened work stoppage of " social importance " a Conciliator has power to convene the parties for discussion following unsuccessful direct negotiations. He is also empowered to assist the parties in negotiating new agreements even though they have not terminated their direct negotiations. Upon being summoned by the Conciliator, the parties are required to designate their representatives and to attend before him.
As a condition of entering upon his duties, the Conciliator may require the parties to postpone a threatened work stoppage for a period not exceeding two weeks. In cases where the stoppage would affect " essential public institutions or services," is " of far-reaching social importance," or (though per se not important) would " be likely to prejudice decisively the possibilities of an amicable settlement of the dispute as a whole," a further two-week postponement may be imposed by the unanimous vote of the three Conciliators. In this special group of cases all three Conciliators may decide to intervene jointly.
To assist the Conciliator in obtaining a factually accurate view of the situation, he may compel the parties to furnish him with statements. Of course, Conciliators are charged with a standing obligation to " keep themselves acquainted with the general situation at the time as regards industrial conditions, and particularly wage conditions." Where, in the course of mediation, the Conciliator finds that matters of a technical nature have not been properly discussed by the parties, he may require them to resume direct negotiations and (subject to a time limit) may meanwhile adjourn the mediation proceedings.
The Given this uniform expiry date, it was possible for the parties to create, and to adhere to, a tight schedule of negotiations.
The first move for a party desiring revision of an existing agreement is to deliver to the opposite party, prior to November 1, a list of proposed changes.
Where no notice is given, the agreement remains in force. Negotiations then commence between the " sub- The Joint Committees comprise partisan representatives from each of the central organisations, from each of the parties to the agreement, and from the occupational group within whose framework ratification must take place. All issues are decided by the Joint Committee by majority vote, and, failing a majority, by an umpire. The issues committed to the Joint Committee, which frequently involve the consideration of local conditions, or piecerate structures peculiar to particular trades, may be decided before or after the conclusion of new agreements. All " non-general "
demands not so dealt with are negotiated under the aegis of a Mediator, and his proposals will then be included in the proposed collective agreements to be voted upon by the various occupational groups. The final step in the process is the submission by the Conciliator to the parties of a proposed collective agreement. In practice, where there is no hope that the parties will agree, the Conciliator usually withdraws. After consulting the parties as to the formal aspects of the proposed collective agreement, the Conciliator fixes a time within which they must accept or reject it. A ratification vote is then conducted by each of the parties by secret ballot which affords a simple negative or affirmative choice. The voting constituencies are the eight occupational groups, although there may be different agreements (with common " general " terms) before the various sub-organisations which comprise a particular occupational group.
The Conciliation Act establishes complex voting rules intended to prevent distortion of the result should a vigorous minority vote and an indifferent majority abstain. Similarly, provision is made for giving proper weight to the result of votes taken at union meetings rather than by membership ballot, since the results of all votes throughout the entire occupational group are pooled and Aside from ad hoc public intervention, the parties are free to make their own bargain. It is interesting to note that they have chosen to use the whole range of negotiating procedures from direct bargaining (initially); to conciliation (the Conciliator's role prior to his making a proposal); to arbitration (voluntarily, of non-general demands); to mediation (the proposed collective agreement advanced by the Conciliator). These procedures each are felt to be appropriate at the particular stage and in the particular circumstances in which they are invoked. Each procedure is only invoked when its use is agreed to by the parties-even mediation, since the Conciliator will not submit a proposed agreement for ratification 21 On the other hand, the statements made in conciliation proceedings may not be published (except with consent of both parties) and the proposed agreement is not published until it has been accepted or rejected. Thus, the extent to which public opinion can be mobilised is limited. In all other cases mediation must precede a work stoppage, subject to three exceptions: There is no real distinction between those matters decided by the Contract Board of 1939 and those decided by arbitration, save that the former were usually " general " questions at the negotiation stage, while the latter were " non-general " or local issues, peculiar to particular trades or enterprises. Frequently, too, matters which involve technical knowledge of the industry and its practices are decided by arbitration.
Several problems which form the hard core of contract adjudication in North America are without counterpart in Denmark.
The most important of these are seniority and unjust discharge. The absence of disputes on these two issues is easily explained by the broad management rights clause [section 4 (1)] in the Basic Agreement, acknowledging the " employers' right to direct and distribute work and to use what labour may in their judgment be suitable," subject only to exercise in a " responsible manner " and to vested rights under collective agreements.
There has been no significant union pressure for a seniority system (to confer a preference in promotion, in lay-offs, and in rehiring upon senior employees) such as that which North American unionists prize so highly. On the one hand, employers tend to exhibit loyalty to the older worker, partially because he is more skilled, productive and stable, partially because of the more intimate relationships in the smaller-scale Danish enterprises.
On the other hand, Denmark's comprehensive and advanced scheme of welfare services (coupled, recently, with full employment) mitigate the harsh consequences of the loss of a job.
The treatment of the unjustly discharged employee is a unique illustration of the Danish attitude towards labour relations. Until 1960 there was no " due process of law " for the discharged employee. The occasional irresponsible acts of individual employers in discharging employees without cause tended to provoke retaliatory wildcat strikes (which were, of course, illegal).
In (a) With a view to furthering production the committee shall deal with all matters relating to rational operation, including such questions as the technical equipment, the planning of the work, economy as regards materials, etc., the aim being organisation of the working process so as to increase the productivity to the widest possible extent in order to reduce the cost of production, to bring about lower prices, and to benefit the undertaking, the persons employed in the undertaking and the community as a whole.
The committee shall also promote the vocational training within the undertaking.
(b) For the purpose of creating the best possible conditions of work, thus promoting job-complacency, the committee shall deal with questions of welfare, safety, health, employment security, etc.
If reductions or reorganisation of the working of the undertaking are contemplated, the committee shall as early as possible deal with the matter in order to make the change as easy as possible for the workers concerned.
(c) In order to encourage the workers' interest in the operation of the undertaking it shall be the duty of the employer to provide the committee with such information about the economic conditions of the undertaking and its position within the trade as is of importance for the conditions of production 29 Most North American arbitrators take the view that their jurisdiction extends so far as to enable them to order the reinstatement in employment of an unjustly discharged employee. and the possibilities of sale in general. Information about the accounts shall be given to the same extent as is normally given to shareholders through the accounts submitted at the annual general meeting of the company. There shall be no obligation to supply information that may be used to the detriment of the undertaking, or information about personal matters. The Committee has no power to affect in any way the negotiation, interpretation, or termination of collective agreements, and acts entirely by consultation and negotiation. Meetings are held after working hours, but the employer pays the employees an hourly rate for attendance. The Committee is empowered to obtain all relevant information, including confidential management communications, which might affect the company's competitive and collective bargaining position were the Committee members not sworn to secrecy.
The technique of the most successful Works Committees has been to prevent dislocation where possible, by means of a transition period during which redundant employees can be relocated either within or outside the enterprise. At the same time, employee support for innovations is secured by inviting employee suggestions and by making employees feel that they are part of the decisionmaking process. Unfortunately, the Works Committee system has not met with universal favour amongst either employers or unionists, despite an active educational campaign by both central organisations. To date, a high level of employment has meant that technologically displaced workers could be easily employed elsewhere, and the system has remained relatively untested. This device is especially desirable for the L.O. as it provides a ground upon which a hopeless case, prosecuted because of internal " political " pressures, can be dropped. The informality of the hearing also enables the parties to " let off steam," after which they may be content to terminate the matter.
Failing settlement, the case comes on for formal hearing the next morning.
Proceedings are held in camera, the parties are represented by counsel34 and may, of course, call evidence.
Immediately after the hearing, without any preliminary caucuses, the partisan judges are polled (plaintiff first) and the presiding judge votes last. He will then prepare a draft judgment which will be discussed at a later meeting of the Court, and will ultimately be delivered to the parties as the unanimous decision of the Court. The partisan judges are thus able to assist the neutrals by frank discussion in conference, but do not derogate from the authority of their decision by refusing to subscribe to it. Cases may be withdrawn at any time before final judgment, a consideration of importance to a party faced with the likely prospect of creating an adverse precedent. The Court of its own motion may remit any appropriate case to arbitration (especially where some technical, factual question is involved) or to the Contract Board of 1939, with or without reserving to itself power of final disposition. In its judgment, the Court usually awards costs against the losing party, although in close cases the costs may be evenly divided.
Subject to these considerations, it delivers judgment in the familiar fashion of any Court.
What is unique, however, is the remedy employed. Aside from its power to order the payment of money where failure to pay is the basis of the proceeding, the primary remedy is the fine. The measure of the fine is determined both by penal and compensatory considerations, as the fine is paid over to the aggrieved party. Thus the Court considers the actual loss incurred, the existence of aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and the seriousness of the offence. Aggravating circumstances may include a refusal to submit to arbitration, or to obey an award of the Court or of an arbitration board.
Extenuating circumstances usually involve some provocative or unjust act of the plaintiff, and the bona fides of the defendant.
The discretionary fine was originally adopted at the suggestion of the unions, and has proved to be an effective device for enforcing adherence to legal obligations.
Not the least reason for its effectiveness is the fact that it is inevitably collected. Employers in Denmark have traditionally refrained from widespread use of the blacklist, the " yellow-dog " contract or the " document " (as it is known in Britain), and of strikebreakers, at least since the September Agreement of 1899. All of these tactics are particularly adaptable for " union-busting " campaigns which are not within the ethos of Danish labour relations. On the other hand, the lockout (both primary and sympathetic) is a recognised bargaining device employed to prevent unions from breaking a wage standard by concentrating pressure on weak employers. Occasionally the lockout does set off a chain-reaction of strike-counter lockout-counter strike with the result that minor disputes achieve major proportions. The propriety of economic strikes and lockouts has been largely determined by the Basic Agreement, and breaches are not litigated in the regular courts.
Picketing is usually unnecessary, since the mere announcement of a strike in the press usually suffices to bring out the work force. Information on picketing designed to advise workers of a dispute is lawful, but that which is intended to procure a customer boycott is unlawful on the theory that the employer's public reputation is permanently damaged. On the same theory, publication of the names of workers who refuse to cease work is forbidden. Danish law recognises a cause of action for the deliberate interference with the rights of another, which is occasionally employed where the union was held to be seeking some improper objective, not related to its normal interests. Organisational strikes are lawful, but (at least in those enterprises affiliated with the D.A.) pressure to compel the closed or union shop is unlawful. There is some case law forbidding union pressure on the employer to discharge non-union employees, but this objective is usually achieved by social ostracism rather than by resort to economic force. In the case of employers not affiliated with the D.A., the closed shop is a lawful labour objective, but unions are compelled to allow non-members to join. Consumer boycotts of employers engaged in a labour dispute have been held to be an unlawful attempt to broaden the range of economic sanctions.
One can only conclude that the Danish common law doctrines are not dissimilar to our own, but that they are seldom invoked because the parties, realising the inherent limitations of the ordinary judicial processes, have chosen instead self-made and selfadministered regulation. This approach to the legal regulation of economic warfare stems from a position not unlike that which Professor Kahn-Freund describes as characteristic of British industrial relations-" collective laissez-faire." 36 Concurred in by the legislature and the courts, it has resulted in an atmosphere of willing acceptance which legislative compulsion has precluded in the United States, and in the consistent and expert analysis of legal problems which is impossible in Canada where common law tort doctrines survive anachronistically in an era of compulsory collective bargaining.
Jurisdictional inter-union disputes 37 are settled intramurally by the L.O., the D.A. having early declined to participate in joint procedures for several reasons: an unwillingness to shoulder a thankless task; a refusal to allow, by implication, monopolistic craft claims; a fear of inhibiting new patterns of industrial development. By way of recapitulation, these institutional devices can be grouped under three headings: First, centralised industry-wide bargaining conducted by professionals in accordance with agreedupon and firm procedural rules. Secondly, private law-making with its implicit commitment by both parties to abide by the law. Thirdly, private processes of adjudication and dispute-settlement in a variety of forums tailor-made for various types of conflicts.
Sceptics, and indeed realists, will properly point out that the Danish system is the result of historical, social and economic forces which have produced a labour lore which is uniquely Danish. Undoubtedly the September Agreement of 1899 was possible because of an existing acceptance of employer *and employee organisation which had no parallel in North America. Undoubtedly, too, the September Agreement in turn created an atmosphere in which labour-management adjustments through private lawmaking were facilitated. Thus, over the years, the parties have accumulated a fund of mutual trust and respect upon which they [VOL. 12 may draw in moments of conflict. There can be no doubt that the lore evokes the law, and that in turn the law generates lore. But to conclude that North Americans are by fate debarred from profiting from the Danish experience is to be hypnotised by the chicken-egg conundrum.
If the Danes can teach us no other lesson, they can teach us this: it is possible, beginning from a crisis situation, to build upon the mutual interdependence of labour and management a legal institutional framework capable of accommodating the opposing interests-given only a will to do so. (e) The board shall hand down a reasoned decision, and in the cases where the board finds the dismissal in question to be unreasonable and not founded on circumstances relating to the worker or the undertaking, the board may decide that the employer shall pay to the dismissed worker a compensation, the amount of which shall depend on the particulars of the case and on the seniority of the improperly dismissed worker, but which cannot exceed thirteen weeks' wages calculated on the basis of the average earnings of the dismissed worker during the preceding year.
Section 5 Subsection 1. Supervisors, foremen, and persons in corresponding positions who represent the employer in relation to the workers, may be required by the employer, after consultation with the person in question, not to become a member of any workers' organisation. Subsection 2. The right conferred on the employer by subsection 1 cannot be asserted merely because a worker is engaged as a salaried employee, if otherwise he does not fulfil the requirements for being recognised as a foreman in the sense of the Main Agreement. Subsection 3. The interested supervisors' organisations should be permitted to be represented at meetings held to deal with disagreements about the above provisions.
Section 6
The parties will oppose possible attempts to keep persons out of workers' organisations on the plea of partnership agreements which do not make the persons in question real partners in the firm. Section 7 Subsection 1. The period of notice to terminate agreements concerning price lists and other working conditions shall be three months, unless otherwise agreed. Subsection 2. Even if an agreement has been denounced or has expired, the parties shall, nevertheless, be bound to comply with its provisions until another agreement has taken its place or stoppage of work has been effected in accordance with the rules of section 2.
Section 8
The central organisations agree that shop steward rules should be inserted in the collective agreements whenever the character of the working conditions makes it practical. Section 9 Subsection 1. The two central organisations will promote co-operation among the organisations and work for peaceful and stable working conditions in the undertakings through joint industrial committees or other suitable bodies. Subsection 2. Collective agreements should aim at wage systems which will promote productivity and in addition give the workers an opportunity for higher earnings than ordinary time rates, because normally, when it is possible to have a job done both as piece work and as work paid by ordinary time rates, a greater amount of work and thereby higher earnings can be expected by piece work rates than by ordinary time rates. Subsection 3. No party may prevent a worker from doing as much and as good work as his abilities and training permit. 
Section 3
In order that the period of negotiation may be used to the best advantage for objective negotiations between the parties, the following rules shall apply :
(1) The party wanting an existing agreement to be revised shall before November 1 of the year preceding expiration of agreements submit complete proposals for such revision.
(2) Subject to the provision of section 6, where no proposal for revision is submitted by any of the parties, the agreement shall remain in force as it stands.
(3) Negotiations between the suborganisations shall be commenced immediately on receipt of the proposals for revision. The negotiations shall be carried on intensively and be brought to a conclusion not later than December 1.
(4) If the negotiations lead to a result that is accepted by both parties, the agreements concerned have thereby been brought to a final conclusion. The results achieved shall be without prejudice to any other results. Where agreement cannot be reached on appointment of an umpire, such appointment shall be left to the Conciliation Board.
(2) In the course of their deliberations for determining the fair price for the work in question, the joint committee may, for purposes of information, require all particulars on conditions of work, prices, wages and piece-work earning in the particular trade. Where local price-lists are concerned, due regard shall be had to the local conditions prevailing.
(3) The joint committee or the umpire shall not be entitled to decide any questions of a general nature [cf. section 5]. Any disagreements as to whether a demand is of such nature shall be decided by the Agreement Board.
(4) Any questions being subject to consideration and decision under the above rules shall as far as possible have been considered and decided by the date when new agreements shall come into force, unless the parties agree to postpone the decision till after conclusion of the negotiation of agreements.
Section 11
(1) Each of the eight groups shall decide, by group, on the attitude to adopt to any final drafts for renewal of agreements. In voting, the individual group cannot be linked with others; within each particular group the rules shall be the same as in the Conciliation (Labour Disputes) Act.
(2) The joint group voting shall cover fields for which agreements are concluded subsequent to December 1, irrespective of the date of voting.
(3) The joint group voting shall not cover fields in which the parties have concluded agreements by themselves prior to December 1 [cf. subsections (3) and (4) of section 3].
Section 12
In the case of any voting on draft agreements being the result of direct negotiation, the rules of voting shall be the same as in the Conciliation (Labour Disputes) Act.
Section 13
If the negotiations with or without the co-operation of the conciliator fail to provide agreement on the demands put forward, either party shall be entitled to give notice of their intention to effect a stoppage of work as from the date of expiration of the agreements; similarly, a sympathetic conflict may be instituted under the provisions of labour law.
Section 14
(1) The last date of due denunciation of agreements shall be February 14.
(2) Any agreements that have not been denounced shall continue to be in force until they are duly denounced in pursuance of their own rules of denunciation.
